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**AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980 ; AGO ltr 11 Jun 1980**


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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

HQDA Ltr 525-74-18

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (18 Apr 74) DAMO-ODU

30 April 1974

Expires 30 April 1975

**SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel Clarence W. Chancey, Chief, Army Section, USMILGP, Bolivia, 23 May 71 - 24 Jun 73 (U)**

**\*NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION\***

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1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U), 2 July 1971.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel Clarence W. Chancey, subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Department of the Army, Headquarters, (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

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
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*Vernon L. Bowers*  
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
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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
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**APO NEW YORK 09867**

SCBO-CO

26 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Colonel Clarence W. Chancey,  
RCS CSFOR-74

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
ATTN: FOR OT UT  
Department of the Army  
Washington, DC 20310

Attached Senior Officer Debriefing Report is forwarded for your records.

Plant 9.1 (100)

WATT G. HILL, JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Commanding Officer

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

UNITED STATES MILITARY GROUP  
APO NEW YORK 09867

SCBO-AR

20 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Colonel Clarence W. Chancey,  
RCS CSFOR-74

THRU: Commander  
US Military Group, Bolivia  
New York APO 09867

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
ATTN: FOR OT UT  
Department of the Army  
Washington, DC 20310

Country: BOLIVIA

Debrief Report by: Clarence W. Chancey, Col, GS (INF) 264-26-9782

Duty Assignments: Chief, Army Section, USMILGP

Inclusive Dates: 23 May 1971 - 24 June 1973

Date of Report: 14 June 1973

1. References: Briefing (C), Bolivian Army G2 to USCINCSO, 19 Dec 71,  
Subject: Bolivian Threat (USMILGP class file 201-04).

Briefing (C), CINC Bolivian FFAA to COMUSNAVSO, 22 Sep 72, Subject: The  
Bolivian Threat (USMILGP class file 201-04). (Attached hereto as Inclosure 4)

Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) (S), Dept of State, Feb 72,  
Subject: Bolivia FY 73-74.

CASP (S), Dept of State, Feb 73, Subject: Bolivia FY 74-75.

Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOP) (S), Dept of Defense, 16 Jan 73  
Subject: Bolivia FY 75-82

Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) (S), Dept of Defense, Jun 72  
Subject: Bolivia FY 74-78

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POM (S), Dept of Defense, 73, Subject: Bolivia FY 75-79.

Study (S), Combined US/Bolivian, Jan-Feb 68, Subject: Modernization of the Bolivian Army (USMILGP class file 202-06).

Study (S), USACDC, 2 Jun 72, Subject: Insurgent Threat to Bolivia (USMILGP class file 202-06).

Study (S), USSOUTHCOM, 15 Apr 70, Subject: Country Intelligence Study-Bolivia.

2. As provided for in paragraph 5a, AR525-14, this report will summarize what has happened within the Bolivian Army during a period of insurgency, changes which have come about, what has been done by the Bolivians themselves and by the Army Section USMILGP to assist the Bolivian Army. Army Section assistance has been directed principally in areas, as follows:

a. To improve their internal defense capability.  
b. To generally improve the efficiency and standards of performance; e.g., maintenance, personnel management, training.

3. The real and imagined threats to Bolivia, the extremists elements, their relationships, weaknesses, goals etc. are all well documented in the cited references, and others. Reference will be made to some of these documents within the body of this report. Much has been written about the weaknesses and problems, the lack of organization and perpetual changes in the Army of this country which occupies the heart of the South American Continent, but little has been done to document positive actions and plans taken by the U.S. Army through the Military Assistance Program to help them improve their Army. Perhaps the latter approach is all the more important because of the fact that there is a very frequent turn-over of key personnel in the Army. Members of the US contingent on a two year tour, in a sense, actually provide what little continuity there is.

4. During the period covered by this report there have been four Army Commanders, the last one having been in office approximately one month. Principal staff officers turn over on an average even faster than the commander. It must be kept in mind that this current situation exists in an atmosphere of relative stability when there have been only two governments within the time frame of this report. The current government has survived approximately two and a half times the average life of a Bolivian government.

5. The author of this report was the U.S. Operations/Training/Organization Counterpart Officer on The Bolivian Army Modernization Study Group which worked with the Bolivian Army staff in January 1968. Many recommendations were made by that combined US/Bolivian group to improve conditions in

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the Army, but few of them were ever implemented. Many of the actions and projected plans included in this report are an extension or modification of those recommendations, most of which remained valid.

6. The last week in May 1971, found the US Peace Corps Volunteers on their way out of Bolivia, having been told to leave by the leftist President, General J. J. Torres, The U.S. MILGP was being attacked publicly also, with an increasing frequency of demands that it too be expelled. The FY 71 MAP Program had been cancelled, following a reduction in the FY 70 Program. President Torres position to the US Ambassador was to the effect that your MILGP isn't doing us any good, so why should they stay? The discontinuance of the MAP Program had stopped the flow of spare parts and MAP equipment was breaking down throughout the Army. An even stronger reason than this existed however for the deterioration of equipment. There was a general lack of interest on the part of commanders and a demoralized Army.

7. In the latter days of the Torres regime an open attempt to subvert the Armed Forces came in the form of a manifesto published in newspapers and attributed to the NCO's and soldiers of the Army. It charged abuses by superiors, general neglect and lack of concern for their needs and welfare, made many demands to rectify the wrongs, and made threats to overthrow their superiors. The authors of the document had no success in creating rebellion within the ranks, however.

8. President Banzer and his key military leaders upon gaining control of the country in August 1971, realized the potential danger of ignoring the long neglected needs of the NCO's and soldiers and set about immediately to improve these conditions. A meager pay raise was instituted and construction was initiated to provide some family quarters on or adjacent to military installations for junior officers and NCO's. Many projects were also undertaken to improve living conditions within the garrisons for all ranks, to include the private soldiers. The Ministry of Defense has large construction projects in the planning stages in La Paz and Cochabamba, where troop densities are the greatest for all three services. These projects include high rise apartment buildings, and recreation centers. The large military General Hospital in La Paz, started years ago is also being completed. President Banzer stated recently in drawing attention to the needs, that Bolivia was the only country in the world that hadn't provided any housing or any assistance in looking after the welfare of its Armed Forces. While the poverty and extremely primitive conditions of the Bolivian soldiers and NCO's have apparently been accepted for decades by everyone in the society-even the victims themselves-the contest for the loyalty of this group began with the manifesto during the leftist domination. The current President and Armed Forces leaders are wisely taking steps to improve the living conditions. This is most important of course, where a stable government is so dependent upon a loyal Armed Force.

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9. This loyalty is not only so important to bolster the government from extremist and dissident groups, but it is very important to the continuance of the current National Popular Front coalition. Leftist elements within the coalition undoubtedly have had ambitions checked because of the loyal support the President enjoys from the Armed Forces. The President, on the other hand, has had a leveling effect on certain rightist elements within the Armed Forces whose patience has run short with these leftist elements in the Front and corruption within the government which they have charged to the parties of the coalition.

10. In addition to these unilateral actions to improve the morale and living conditions of the Armed Forces, certain other actions have been taken in collaboration with the U.S. Army Element in Bolivia which have improved the efficiency of the Army considerably.

11. We were able with perseverance to get the new Commander and staff who came in with the Banzer government to take a systems approach to determine their needs. Their initial frantic demand for extra-ordinary assistance from the U.S. stated a requirement for trucks, radios, modern arms, munitions, airplanes, etc. They had no basis for determining realistically how many. They also complained bitterly of all MAP equipment being inoperable and of no use to them in this critical time when the leftist elements could be regrouping to return to Bolivia. By our own estimate, at least 60% of the equipment was inoperable and we already were developing a plan to create an effective maintenance system in the Army when the new government came to power. The Commander was assured that a very high percentage of the old equipment could be made operable with command emphasis and an organized approach to maintenance. As for their insistence on extra-ordinary help in getting urgently needed equipment we requested and received support through all U.S. echelons for expedited delivery of those items that could be justified on a reasonable basis; i.e., some trucks, radios, and munitions. We also insisted that the Bolivians would have to analyze the threat and configure their organization to counter that threat in order to establish the basis for materiel requirements. The organization thus developed could become the basis for additional MAP support. The end result of this analysis was the development of a TOE for the "Regimiento Tipo" (Type Regiment), which is designed to counter urban and rural insurgency situations. (See organizational diagram at Inclosure 1 .) It was agreed by the U.S. authorities that justification had been established and equipment for five of these regiments would be included in MAP programs, as follows: FY 72-highest priority major items for 2 regiments; FY 73-remaining items for the first two regiments initiated the previous year, plus one complete regiment; FY 74-one complete regiment; FY 75-one complete regiment. (See list of major items of equipment at Inclosure 2 .)

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12. The concept of deployment for this "type" organization is to make one organic to each of the five divisions assigned responsibility for the most populated regions of the country. The principal town in each of the respective regions is: La Paz, Oruro, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and Camiri. The increased mobility and firepower which will be provided to each division when they receive the new regiment with its MAF procured equipment, will permit rapid response to any urban situation beyond the capability of the police forces and also increase their capability to reinforce other organic units within the rural sectors of their area of responsibility.

13. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, during a visit to Bolivia in December 1971, stated that he would seek to get an early delivery of 12 M113 vehicles to show good faith in support of the Bolivian desire to strengthen their forces. These vehicles were to be the authorized quantity of armored personnel carriers for the second regiment, because it had been agreed with the Army Commander that the V-100 armored vehicles and other armored vehicles already in country would serve to satisfy the requirement for the first regiment. The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army approved the request for early delivery, and the first 12 M113 vehicles were in possession of the Bolivian regiment by 15 March 1972.

14. Also during the period following the overthrow of the Torres regime, a very comprehensive plan for the improvement of the maintenance system throughout the Bolivian was completed by the U.S. Army Element. It was briefed to the Army Commander and his staff in November 1971. The commander agreed to complete cooperation and support of the program, the implementation of which required the Boliviens to match a US Maintenance MTT on a man-for-man basis.

15. Within six months of a sadly deteriorating situation under a leftist government, the Bolivian Army, with our advice and assistance had settled down and taken an objective view of their situation. The first of the newly created regiments was organized and manned by February 1972 and had initiated training. This regiment is located at Guequi, approximately 50 miles from La Paz. A group of officers and NCOs had been sent to Panama for OJT with the U.S. mechanized unit in operation, maintenance and employment of the M113 vehicles. A U.S. Technical Assistance Team and the ARSEC representative met the vehicles at the port, accompanied them to the unit location, and provided additional OJT as part of the technical inspection in turning the vehicles over to the unit. Also in March the Maintenance MTT arrived in country to commence the complete restructuring of the Army Maintenance System.

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16. The combined US/Bolivian Maintenance Team was formed immediately and started their work in the Army General Maintenance Center in La Paz. They had the complete cooperation of the Army G4, and in fact were given the authority to speak for him in effecting changes in procedures and systems. After revamping the operation of this principal maintenance center they moved to the other centers in the country and moved out to the units supported by each of the centers. They inspected and classified equipment in all categories as to repairable or non-repairable. They cannibalized the non-repairable equipment, using the parts to start repairs on the repairable equipment. The salvage remaining from non-repairable equipment was disposed of as prescribed. PLL and ASL were established and spare parts requisitioned through MAP. As the spare parts came in, repairs were continued and a rebuild capability was established in the general maintenance center which never had existed previously. This also permitted the initiation of a direct exchange operation.

17. Proposed policies and regulations were written and submitted to the Army G4 to implement the newly established system, which was compatible with the U.S. system but adapted to the actual conditions in the Bolivian Army. The G4 concurred in the recommendations and is staffing them for approval. The results of this maintenance improvement program are shown in Inclosure 3 . The US MTT departed Bolivia in November 1972. The follow-up by assigned US Army Section personnel has been continuous and the cooperation of the Army G4 is continuing. The rebuild output in the General Maintenance Center is increasing each month. The prospects are bright for a well established maintenance base to continue as a reality in support of the Army.

18. Delivery of Equipment to the Type Regiment has not been as fast as the Bolivian Commanders would have liked. Availability of funds, priorities and production lead times have been explained to them repeatedly. Though they never acknowledge that they understand the process that must be followed from programming to delivery, they do understand. Their tactic appears to be to keep the pressure on at all levels to get the equipment delivered at the earliest possible time. As of this writing, undelivered major items of equipment for the first two regiments are scheduled to be available for delivery by 31 December 1973, except for the majority of the communications equipment and most of the trucks. Production time on the latter items is such that they will not be ready for delivery; however, some of the trucks will be available in the first quarter CY 1974.

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19. The Army proceeded with the organization of the second "type" unit in Santa Cruz and the third in Cochabamba. This is an indication that inspite of what they may say about deliveries, they believe that the US is going to support them.

20. There is no doubt that the equipment that is available to the first new regiment, even though not complete, has already played a big role in maintaining law and order, and probably in sustaining the Banzer government through one of its biggest crisis: The devaluation in October 1972. The regiment and particularly its armored personnel carriers were used to make a show of force in La Paz when the police could no longer control the situation during the October strikes and demonstrations. They were moved to take up position in the heart of the disturbance area at the height of the disorder. The presence of the tracked vehicles with their mounted weapons and their dismounted soldiers-in conjunction with military patrols, was silent evidence of the governmental authority and power to control. The disturbances subsided almost immediately and within 2 or 3 days leaders of the protesting elements were negotiating with the government again in peace. The regiment was also moved by train to the Oruru mining region in February 1973, to participate in a sizeable show of force during a period of threatened trouble from the miners. This military demonstration was staged as one of the largest military parades to be held in Oruru. Troops were brought in from La Paz and Cochabamba in addition to the troops stationed in the Oruru Department. All of the Armored personnel carriers in the Army were paraded along with the troops from 3 divisions. A parachute drop was conducted by the airborne battalion and a bombing and strafing demonstration was conducted outside of town by the Air Force. The desired psychological effect was realized.

21. The actions by the several agencies of government in keeping the extremist elements off balance, as demonstrated by the capture of safe-houses and several key extremist leaders, as reported by Gen Zenteno in his remarks to COMUSMAVSO (See Inclosure 4), and the actions of the Army in maintaining law/order for the established government have contributed toward a period of relative stability over the past year. The equipment provided through MAP for this new Army organization has had a direct bearing on the Army's role during this period.

22. The projected MAP GA materiel assistance to Bolivia through FY 80 shown at Inclosure 5, is considered valid unless the Bolivian economic situation would permit everything to be purchased through FMS, or a

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graduated decrease in GA assistance as the economic conditions improve. The equipment objectives are valid whether they be obtained by GA or FMS. In the event Grant-Aid should be drastically reduced and the economic situation would not permit FMS purchases, it is considered important to provide at least the first three regiments no matter how long it takes. This would provide the capability to strengthen and control the La Paz - Oruro - Santa Cruz axis, which is considered vital to the security of the country, as Gen Zenteno points out in his statement at Inclosure 4. Maximum effort should be made to arrange favorable FMS terms to reach the same goal in the event grant-aid should be terminated.

23. The other units projected for FY 76 and beyond in Inclosure 5 are considered necessary to enhance the operational capability of the Army in the field. Their establishment should be pursued in the order proposed as availability of funds permit, whether by our assistance or on their own.

24. MAP training has played a vital role in this period of improvement. In addition to the maintenance OJT received throughout the Army from the maintenance MTT, increased emphasis was given to sending personnel for maintenance training at the School of Americas in Panama in weapons, communications and vehicles. (See Inclosure 6)

25. A special OJT course was arranged with the School of Americas for training personnel in the operation of 4.2 mortars, which are being introduced to Bolivia with the new regiment. This group of officers and NCO's will be the cadre to conduct 4.2 mortar training within the Army as new units are formed.

26. The Bolivian Army school system must now incorporate maintenance training appropriate to each level of schooling. Enlisted training is totally inadequate and officer training is completely devoid of maintenance training so far as can be determined. A proposal has been made that US trained Bolivian officers and NCO's be used as instructors and POI's from the School of Americas, with modifications as appropriate, be used to initiate a program of instruction at the earliest possible date. This idea has not been accepted as yet, but it should be pursued.

27. Personnel management in the Army is an area in which concentrated effort on the part of US Army section has been made to encourage improvement. We have been successful in two phases; personnel classification and information retrieval. A study to implement an MOS coding system similar in concept to that of the U.S. Army was

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completed in April 1973, and is before the commander for approval. The study includes recommended directives for the application of an enlisted and officer MOS Classification Structure. US Army Section is advising and assisting with a pilot project within the Army Engineer Command preparing data sheets for punching in Panama, which include the proposed MOSC.

28. With guidance and advice received from USARSO MISO, the Army is preparing to use electrical accounting machines such as card punches, sorters, line printers, etc. Military and civilian personnel are about half-way through training as programmers received from qualified Bolivian instructors.

29. The US Army Section was given responsibility as the single manager agent for USMILGP to collaborate in the establishment of a joint medical supply system for all services, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense.

30. A Medical Supply MTT was brought in to work with the ARSEC Medical Supply Advisor. A school was conducted which taught the procedures for receipt, control, storage, and distribution of supplies. The students were officers who were designated to manage the MOD system. Policies and directives were developed and published and forms for control were published. This actually created the organization and commenced the functioning of the system. Training for operators was conducted thereafter. MAP medical supplies and equipment had previously been stored and administered directly by USMILGP because there was no host country capability. Upon establishment of the new organization supplies were then turned over to it. Supplies now are turned directly over to them upon arrival in country, just as in the case of all other MAP equipment. The most difficult task now is to convince the users that they must request supplies through their own channels instead of directly from USMILGP, as they had done for so many years.

SUMMARY


31. Much remains to be done, even in the way of keeping the actions going which were started during this period. Specific actions in this respect are as follows:

- a. Continuance of the Bolivian interest and emphasis in making the restructured maintenance system function.

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
- b. Proper utilization of MAP trained personnel for the new equipment, particularly M113 maintenance and training of 4.2 mortar personnel.
  - c. Instituting a maintenance instruction program in the Bolivian Army School System.
  - d. Follow up to assure the implementation of the long over-due personnel classification system.
32. Emphasis should be given to getting qualified Bolivians training more Bolivians. This applies to the Army as a whole, by getting personnel who have been trained at the School of Americas, by in-country MTT's and by OJT in Panama into utilization assignments and where qualified, as instructors in the areas for which they have been trained. This emphasis is most important however, in all facets of maintenance and in getting the new regiments organized and functioning.
33. The experiences gained by the first "Regimiento Tipo" must be passed on to the succeeding units as each receives its equipment. Qualified personnel who can pass on this knowledge and experience will be lost through normal turn over and movement of personnel if attention is not given to this. The logical solution to the problem, from the Bolivian point of view, would be to ask for more OJT and MTT's etc. The MOS system and information retrieval will be a boon in this area of identifying qualified people.
34. The eventual formation of an army signal support battalion, a medical battalion to include the development of a non-existent evacuation system, and an organic engineer company to each division to provide a capability for civic action projects and limited combat engineer functions will greatly enhance the operational capabilities of the Army and contribute to improved internal security.
35. Overall, the Bolivian Army which has traditionally been the institution which provides what governmental stability there has been in the country, has contributed significantly to the maintenance of law and order through the disciplined application of its resources. It appears to have the respect of the people for its firm but measured display of power. The extremist elements appear to be disorganized and off-balance at the present. All security agencies of the government appear to be well coordinated in keeping them off-balance.

  
CLARENCE W. CHANCERY, JR.  
Col GS  
Chief Army Section

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ORGANIZATION DIAGRAM : TIPO REGIMENT



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SUBJECT: Major Items of Equipment, TIPD Regiment

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATION/Regiment</u>
APO M113	12
Radio AN/VRC-18	12
Mortar 4.2	6
Mortar 81mm	18
LMG M1919A4	19
LMG M1919A6	18
BAR M1918A2	108
MG .50 cal M2	3
Pistol .45 cal	424
Carbine .30 cal M2	1,100
Rocket Launcher 3.5	18
Radio AN/GRC-160	3
Radio AN/PRC-77	61
Radio AN/VRC-12	2
Truck 1-Ton	19
Truck $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton	28
Truck 6-Ton	36
Shop Van 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton	1
Wrecker	1
Fuel Truck 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton	1
Water Truck 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton	1
Ambulance	1

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**LOGISTICS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM RESUME**

**BACKGROUND:**

In the August - November 1971 time frame, ARSEC personnel developed a Country Logistics Improvement Plan designed to help the Bolivian Army improve their logistics system which existed but was not effective. This plan was presented in various briefings to a senior commanders and staff members of all the Armed Forces. The major U.S. effort included in this plan was the provision of an MTT from the Canal Zone to come in country and work with Bolivian Army personnel to improve the system and at the same time train their personnel to continue improvement after departure of U.S. MTT personnel.

During the period the U.S. MTT was in country, work was performed and training conducted in each major unit of the Bolivian Army down to regiment level. In accomplishment of the MTT mission all equipment on hand was identified and classified. All deadline repair parts requirements were identified for ordering through the supply system. Training was conducted in the units on the proper procedures for effective organizational level supply and maintenance systems. Training requirements beyond MTT and organizational level capability were identified. Maintenance assistance was provided, as time permitted, to each unit visited to help remove equipment from deadline. Based on the experiences of the MTT after visiting units and completely understanding the situation, standard procedures were developed for approval and publication in directive form by the Bolivian Army.

During the performance of this mission, the Bolivian Army had assigned counterparts of highly qualified technical NCO's who, after the additional training with the MTT, are very capable of continuing the efforts given the support by the Bolivian Army.

**CURRENT ACTION/STATUS:**

Training requirements as determined by MTT personnel which cannot be effectively conducted in-country have been determined and provided to MAP-T for inclusion in future training programs, see Annex A. The major areas identified were in artillery, small arms, generator equipment, commo equipment, and tracked vehicles. The Bolivian Army is capable, for the most part, of effectively training at organizational level in country. With the assistance provided by the ARSEC/MILGP, track personnel have been sent to Panama for OJT in mechanized units. OS and GS level training will require assistance through MAP-T from outside sources especially for the M113A1 APC with the diesel engines. Organizational level maintenance training can be programmed in country for the M113A1 by the recently assigned maintenance NCO to the ARSEC Logistics Section.

Investigation indicates that no maintenance or maintenance management training is provided in the Bolivian Army Schools System for NCC's, junior officers and senior officers. This is a continuing point of interest and emphasis is being placed on MAP-T personnel in an effort to encourage the Bolivians to support themselves in maintenance and management training. A program is currently being developed which will be presented to the Army Commander recommending specific courses for inclusion in the Bolivian School System at the technician, inter-

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mediate (company grade), and management (field grade) levels. It is planned to utilized former guest instructors from USARSA, augmented by additional training at that school as necessary. The POI's for the various levels of training cited above will be taken from the corresponding courses at USARSA.

The second type regiment to be organized from the "Manchego" and "Braun" regiments in Santa Cruz does not have the capability to support the equipment programmed for a type regiment either at unit level or at the maintenance center level supporting the Senta Cruz area. The U.S. MTT gave adequate training and assistance in these areas to start an effective logistics base. Considerable effort is required however on the part of the Bolivian Army to put enough emphasis by providing qualified personnel and adequate facilities to effectively support the units currently in the area and the additional equipment programmed to come in for the type regiment.

The standard procedures developed by the MTT, see Annex B, were designed to provide a basis for publishing directives which should be carried out within the Army. The procedures cut the red tape and bureaucracy which has existed and provide a streamlined system for a unit to follow in receiving logistics support. Technical/mobile assistance teams are included in the procedures so that at division and army levels continual visits to all units, especially the remote units, will determine assistance needed and permit follow up action (mobile concept). Periodic Army Command/level inspection visits are also included. Therefore a means is provided at the Army level to enforce directives at all command levels. These proposed standard procedures have been translated to Spanish and are being reviewed in the office of the Bolivian Army G-4 for clarity and content. After this review the procedures will be forwarded to the Bolivian Army under official letter as recommendations for procedures to be established, published and followed.

The accomplishments of the MTT with reference to the materiel on hand in country are shown in Annex C, Summary of Work Completed. The number of personnel trained by the MTT in the various categories of specialization is reflected in Annex D. This training was conducted in all units and maintenance centers with which the team worked.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION:**

The following require emphasis to continue and improve the logistics training effort.

- a. That the Bolivian Army put maximum effort to increasing in-country logistics/management training in the POI of their schools for both enlisted and officer personnel. Specific proposed actions are now being developed.
- b. That the Bolivian Army publish and enforce standard procedures for improving supply and maintenance on base.
- c. That the Bolivian Army concentrate on improving the personnel assigned and facilities at each maintenance center. The objective is to better the support capability of these centers.
- d. That the Bolivian Army be reminded that delivery of type regiment equipment will depend on their progress in developing adequate capability to support the equipment. This support includes all levels of logistics support ie. fuel, lubricants, organizational level, support level, qualified personnel and facilities.

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e. That the U.S. continue to support training requirements beyond the in-country capability in the areas identified to date. These requirements will be augmented as further requirements are identified.

f. That the Bolivian Army continue the logistics improvement effort army wide by effective utilization of existing team of technicians and by organizing and utilizing mobile technical assistance teams at division and army levels. These teams would work with and augment the efforts of logistics personnel assigned to ARSEC/USMILGP.

g. That command emphasis on supply and maintenance procedures be provided through IG/Command inspections. Results should require commanders to take action in weak areas.

h. That there should be a concentrated effort by the Bolivian Army to more effectively distribute highly qualified technical personnel to areas where they are most needed.

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ANNEX A

(TRAINING REQUIREMENTS) TO LOGISTICS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM RESUME (10 NOVEMBER  
1972)

Type Activity/Equipment and Maint Description	Maint Position Vacancies
1. Artillery:	6
a. Sight Repair	
b. OJT Cross Training in Small arms	
2. Gen Equipment Repair:	4
a. Organizational, DS and GS Level Maint.	
b. Organizational Level Operation	
3. Engineer:	6
Organizational Level Maintenance and Operation	
4. Small Arms Repairman:	10
a. OJT Cross Training in Arty Repair	
b. Use of Guages	
5. Radio Repair:	10
Organizational Level Maint and Operation	
6. WH/Track VEH Repair:	10
M113A1 Organizational and DS Level Maint.	
7. Supply:	8
Unit Level Repair Parts Supply	

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**ANNEX B**

**(LOGISTICS PROCEDURES) TO LOGISTICS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM RESUME (LIPR)**

1. Purpose. To specify procedures and directives for use in improving logistical programs.
2. Scope: The logistics procedures consist of appendices including unit level supply and maintenance SOP, Army Level Directives and Maintenance Center Standing Procedures.

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**APPENDIX 1**

(STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES, MAINTENANCE, UNIT LEVEL TO ANNEX B (LOGISTICS PROCEDURES) TO LIPR

1. Purpose: The purpose of this SOP is to outline the responsibilities for maintenance of all unit's equipment authorized in the unit.
2. Objective: The objective of this SOP is to insure high standards of maintenance and repair for all items of equipment for this unit and to insure correctness in maintenance procedures.

**SECTION I: General.**

The primary function of the Unit Maintenance Section is to maintain the equipment for which they are responsible in the highest possible state of combat readiness at all times. This will be accomplished through the maximum use of personnel skills available.

**SECTION II: Responsibilities.**

A. General: It is the responsibility of the Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Platoon Sgts and Section Leaders to insure that the equipment is properly utilized and that the drivers, operators, and all individuals assigned an item of equipment perform required preventive maintenance. They will report to the unit commanders any misuse or destruction of equipment.

1. Chief of Services: The Chief of Services is directly responsible to the Commanding Officer for the proper operation of the Unit Motor Pool, Electronic Shop, and the Armament Repair Shop.

a. He will advise the Unit Commander in all matters pertaining to maintenance.

b. He will insure that proper facilities are made available for the storage and maintenance of automotive, electronic, armament, and any other equipment material requiring preventive maintenance.

c. He will insure that the Prescribed Load List is properly maintained as authorized.

d. He will insure that all sections have their periodical maintenance properly scheduled for material requiring periodical maintenance.

e. He will conduct periodical spot checks/inspections of the different sections to insure that periodical maintenance is being performed.

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f. He will organize and supervise daily preventive maintenance on all equipment on the date and time set by the Unit Commander.

g. He will insure that all repair parts authorized on the Prescribed Load List are on hand or on requisition at all times.

h. He will insure that the unit performs cannibalization only when authorized by higher headquarters.

i. He will set up maintenance, drivers, and operators training programs as the need arise.

2. Maintenance Officer: The Maintenance Officer is directly responsible to the Chief of Services and/or the Unit Commander for the proper operation of the Unit Motor Pool and assigned personnel.

a. He will advise the Chief of Services and/or Unit Commander in all matters pertaining to motor maintenance.

b. He will conduct maintenance, drivers, and operators training programs as necessary.

c. He will insure that periodical maintenance is properly scheduled and is being performed on the days indicated by the schedule maintenance forms.

d. He will insure that the Prescribed Load List, when authorized, is on hand, or on requisition, at all times and that all records and forms required are properly maintained.

e. He will directly supervise driver's and operator's preventive maintenance on the date and time prescribed by the Unit Commander and/or the Chief of Services.

3. Motor Maintenance Supervisor (NCO): The maintenance supervisor is directly responsible to the Maintenance Officer for the proper operation of the Motor Pool and the supervision of all personnel involved.

a. He will supervise the scheduling of all periodical maintenance utilizing Form 314, or a local translation of this form.

b. He will maintain the Prescribed Load List, when authorized.

c. He will insure that all PLL records are properly maintained.

d. He will insure that all items of PLL are on hand, or on requisition.

e. He will insure that all repair parts "as needed" are immediately placed on requisition and all records properly annotated.

f. He will distribute the work load and assign the various personnel to their tasks.

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- g. He will insure that maintenance is properly performed at all times.
- h. He will conduct maintenance, drivers, and operators training when directed by the Unit Commander and/or Chief of Services.
- i. He will insure that deadlined equipment is promptly evacuated to the Maintenance Center, when repairs required are beyond unit's capabilities.

4. Electronic and Communication Equipment Maintenance Supervisor: The electronic maintenance supervisor is directly responsible to the Chief of Services for the proper operation of the electronic maintenance shop.

- a. He will insure that all Communication and Electronic equipment not in use is stored in the C&E shop except vehicle mounted radios when they are being used.
- b. He will insure that Form 314, or a local translation of this form, is kept on all communication equipment requiring periodical maintenance.
- c. He will be responsible for the performance of all maintenance.
- d. He will maintain the Prescribed Load List and related forms, when PLL is authorized.
- e. He will insure that all required repair parts are placed on requisition when the need arise.
- f. He will insure that all equipment needing repair beyond the Unit's capabilities is promptly evacuated to the Maintenance Center.
- g. He will insure, by continuous checks, that all test equipment is in proper working order.

5. Armament Maintenance Supervisor: The armament maintenance supervisor is directly responsible to the Chief of Services for the proper operation of the Armament Repair Shop.

- a. He will insure that all weapons assigned to the Unit are kept in proper working order.
- b. He will insure that a Form 314, or local translation of this Form, is prepared and maintained on all weapons requiring periodical maintenance services.
- c. He will insure that all maintenance is performed when required.
- d. He will insure, perform and/or supervise organizational repairs when required.

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e. He will insure that there is sufficient lubricants and cleaning material available or on request at all times for the performance of preventive maintenance services.

f. He will insure that all items of equipment needing repairs beyond the unit's capabilities are promptly evacuated to the Maintenance Center.

g. He will maintain the Prescribed Load List and related forms.

h. He will insure that all items of PLL are on hand or on requisition at all times.

i. He will insure that all requirements for repair parts are promptly satisfied by placing a requisition through the appropriate channels.

B. Safety: The safe operation of shops, vehicles, and equipment is the responsibility of everyone. All drivers, operators, and mechanics will have a minimum of one hour safety training each week, or when the unit commander so directs.

1. Safety rules:

a. A speed limit in the Motor pool should be set not to exceed 5 MPH (8KMH) and in first gear.

b. Backing vehicles without a ground guide is prohibited.

c. Driving while intoxicated is prohibited.

d. All fuel consuming equipment should have a fire extinguisher in it when in operation.

e. Smoking in authorized areas only, and never when driving.

f. Gasoline will not be used for cleaning purposes.

g. All jewelry or metal objects will be removed while working on electrical equipment.

h. Power generators will not be operated without a ground rod.

i. All oil or grease spillage will be cleaned immediately.

j. Goggles will be worn when welding or while operating the grinder.

k. The proper use of all tools will be enforced by all supervisors.

l. The wearing of loose clothing while operating equipment or performing maintenance is prohibited.

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- m. No heavy lifting will be done by personnel without assistance or the use of lifting equipment.
- n. Batteries (negative cable) will be disconnected when working on electrical systems.
- o. No live ammo will be stored in or near living quarters.
- p. Fueling operations will be done with the engines at a stop and all electrical systems turned off.

**SECTION III: Repair Parts.**

- A. Responsibility for repair parts for all types of equipment on hand rests with the Chief of Services.
- B. All units authorized a Prescribed Load List will prepare and maintain this list under the control of the Chief of Services.
- C. The prescribed Load List will consist of the following:
  1. A consolidated listing of Form 2063R, or local translation of this form, for all repair parts authorized for stockage by the ZOP manuals of all major items of equipment on hand at the unit.
  2. Form 3318, or local translation of this form, for each repair part in the listing.
  3. Form 2064, or local translation of this form, will be maintained to register all requests for repair parts submitted to the Centro.
  4. All requests for repair parts will be prepared on Format 0001CGM and submitted to the Maintenance Center.
  5. Requests will be posted to Form 3318, Record and Demand Card, and logged on Form 2064, Document Register.
  6. When copy of Format 0001CGM is returned to the unit, appropriate entries will be made on Form 3318 and Form 2064.

**SECTION IV: On the Job Training.**

- A. This method will be utilized by the Commanders to insure that the unit have adequate maintenance personnel, drivers, and operators at all times.
- B. Due to the units mission and the constant turn-over of personnel, on the job training must be a continuous program.
- C. Unit Commanders not capable of attaining this goal will seek assistance from the Maintenance Center Commander and/or the G-4 of their parent unit.

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**APPENDIX 2 (DIRECTIVE FOR MAINTENANCE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, ARMY LEVEL)  
TO ANNEX B (LOGISTICS PROCEDURES) TO LIPR.**

**1. PURPOSE.**

This directive defines the material maintenance component of the Army Logistic System, assigns functional responsibilities, and prescribes policies for the conduct and management of the Army material maintenance function.

**2. SCOPE.**

a. To establish basic concepts and policies and assign responsibilities for:

- (1) Maintenance operations of Army owned or supported equipment.
- (2) Evacuating and determining the eligibility of unserviceable material for repair, overhaul, or disposal.
- (3) Controlled cannibalization of equipment
- (4) Direct exchange support of Army equipment.
- (5) The establishment and operation of material maintenance management systems.

b. This directive applies to:

- (1) All Army owned or supported material whether procured thru MAP, commercially or from another (third Country) Country assistance.
- (2) Conduct and management of material maintenance operation.
- (3) The establishment, design, execution and revision of the Army Logistics System.
- (4) All commands, organizations, installations and units having responsibilities for logistics activities and functions.

c. Objective. The objectives of this directive are:

- (1) To sustain material in the inventory in a mission-ready condition in a timely, effective, and economical manner.
- (2) To insure that the material maintenance components of the Army Logistics System is responsive to the needs of field commanders.

**3. RESPONSIBILITIES.**

a. DCS of Logistics (G-4).

(1) Responsible for the organization, structure, design, development, implementation, operation, maintenance, management supervision and evaluation of the Army Logistic System and its subsystems. This includes establishing basic policies and objectives and assigning overall responsibilities for the following:

- (a) Accomplishment of the material maintenance function.
- (b) Development, implementation, operation, and maintenance of a standard system for the management of the Army material maintenance function at all levels of command.

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(c) Organization of a technical assistance team to visit and assist Bolivian Army Unit commanders in the logistics area.

(I) This team is to be composed of a minimum of one NCO technician in each maintenance field, ie, one motor maintenance technician, one armament technician, one electronic equipment technician, and one supply specialist.

(II) This team will conduct periodical visits to the units within the Bolivian Army.

(III) The primary duties of this team will be to assist the unit commanders in solving logistic and maintenance problems before or when they arise.

(IV) This team will serve as liaison between the units and the Bolivian Army G-4.

(V) This team will conduct "On the Job" training programs as required.

(VI) This team will report to the G-4 any deviation from standards, any problem areas which they cannot solve with the unit commanders.

(d) Controlled cannibalization and exchange of serviceable/unserviceable parts of Army equipment.

(e) Determination of the eligibility of unserviceable Army material for repair, overhaul, salvage or disposal.

(f) Control of the salvage and disposal equipment.

(g) Notification of Logistics Advisor, USMILGP when MAP provided equipment should be salvaged so that a joint US/Bolivian inspection can be made and necessary documents of disposition can be made.

(2) Responsibility for the development, maintenance, and administration of a standard system that satisfies technically qualified personnel requirements for the maintenance support of Army material. This includes the timely provision, individual training, and distribution of maintenance personnel.

(3) Supervision of unit training to include the training of maintenance support centers and the training of other type units in performance of their material maintenance duties.

(4) Preparing, acquiring, and maintaining current equipment technical publications which cover in clear and specific language essential aspects of technical operation, maintenance, and repair parts support of material.

b. The general maintenance center of the Army.

(1) Will be responsible to maintain a basic load of stock of 2nd, 3rd and 4th level to lend support to all units of the Bolivian Army. This obligation includes all the authorized supplies in the basic obligation or prescribed obligation of 2nd level in the units.

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(2) The Supply Officer is responsible for the basic supplies to be established and maintained in accordance with the existing specified rules; he will be responsible to the Commander of the General Center of Maintenance of the Army for control and accountability of said supplies.

(3) The General Center of Maintenance of the Army will receive all Orders of Work of the units in the indicated areas of responsibility for the Estado Mayor. The order of work will be given to the Chief of Workshops of whatever center, or his representative, who will verify the necessities contemplated in the order of work.

(4) The Inspection Section of the Center will carry out a technical revision of equipment and will determine all necessary repairs, at the same time take action to fulfill the orders for the required supplies, to be effective in the respective formulas. Once repair is made to equipment the Inspection Section will make a final revision in order to verify that repairs have been correctly executed. Once this work is verified, the Unit to whom this equipment belongs will be notified to reclaim it by the most expeditious means possible.

(5) Will give information weekly on those jobs completed during the week to the IV Department EMC in a detailed form.

(6) Maintain and operate an effective direct exchange program for supported units.

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c. Army Division Commanders will:

(1) Disseminate any necessary implementing instructions and procedures to guide subordinate commanders in complying with this directive.

(2) Determine requirements for maintenance resources necessary to accomplish their Material Maintenance Missions.

(3) Determine how these requirements will be met through use of existing or increased organic resources.

(4) Organize plan program and budget to obtain and properly use maintenance resources to include acquiring and maintaining assigned maintenance operations in support of Bolivian Army units.

(5) Provide technical supervision and management control over material maintenance programs of their commands to include organizing and maintaining instruction and assistance teams.

(a) These teams are to be composed of a minimum of one NCO technician in each maintenance field i.e., one motor maintenance technician one armament technician one electronic equipment technician and one supply specialist.

(b) This team will conduct periodical visits to the units within the division.

(c) The primary duties of this team will be to assist the unit or regimental commanders in solving logistic and maintenance problems before or when they arise.

(d) This team will serve as liaison between the units and the Maintenance Centers.

(e) This team will conduct "on the job training" programs as required.

(f) This team will report any deviation from standards, any problems areas which they cannot solve with the unit commanders to the Division Commander.

(6) Establish operational usage standards for combat vehicles in their command.

(7) Insure proper use of manuals to perform periodical maintenance of equipment in operating units under their control.

(8) Insure maximum use of test equipment in the inspection and testing of equipment to minimize requirements for complete disassembly and eliminate unnecessary installation of new parts and the inadvertent discarding of serviceable or recoverable parts.

(9) Reviewing program accomplishments in relation to the effective and efficient use of the resources provided and taking necessary corrective action.

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(10) Evaluating and recommending changes to or new maintenance concepts doctrine policies plans and procedures to insure that they contribute to the effective and efficient accomplishment of their overall military missions.

4. An evaluation will be made of the Army Logistics System as a point of primary interest during visits of the Bolivian Army Inspector General. The G4 and Division Commanders will utilize the assistance teams organized and operated under their control as a basis for keeping informed on logistics problems and actions to take in resolving these problems.

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APPENDIX 3 (SOP MAINTENANCE CENTER LEVEL)  
TO ANNEX B (LOGISTICS PROCEDURES) TO LIPR

1. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this SOP is to insure proper functioning of the maintenance centers and to establish policies and guidance, by which the centers may render the support required to units assigned to them.

2. GENERAL.

A. The Maintenance Center in La Paz is designated as El Centro General de Mantenimiento. This center will have the overall responsibility for support of the Bolivian Army. The maintenance center in Cochabamba is designated as "Centro de Mantenimiento No. 1". The maintenance center outside of Santa Cruz is designated as Centro do Mantenimiento No. 2.

B. El Centro General de Mantenimiento will provide direct support to all those units in the 1st and 2nd Division areas. It will provide general support to the maintenance Centers No. 1 and No. 2.

C. The Maintenance Centers No. 1 and No. 2. will provide direct support to those units in their respective areas as designated by the Estado Mayor.

3. SUPPLY PROCEDURES.

A. The Centro General de Mantenimiento will be responsible to maintain an Authorized Stockage List (ASL of repair parts of 2nd, 3rd and 4th echelon required to support the Bolivian Army.

B. The Supply Officer has the following responsibilities:

(1) Of ensuring that all repair parts in the ASL are on hand in required quantities, or on requisition at all times.

(2) Will ensure that all supply operations and functions are properly maintained.

C. The Editor has the following responsibilities:

(1) Will ensure that all requests are submitted using Form CGME 0001 in triplicate.

(2) Will ensure requests are properly signed and documented by the requesting unit.

(3) Will ensure that all information required on the form is correct.

(4) Will review the ASL to see if the items required are in stock or are fringe items.

(5) If the items requested are part of the ASL, he will turn the request over to the stock record clerk.

D. Stock Record Clerk has the following responsibilities:

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- (1) Will immediately initiate actions to release the requested items to the unit.
- (2) If the item requested is at Zero balance, a Due Out will be established to facilitate an automatic issue to the requesting unit when the items are received by the supply section.
- (3) If the item requested is a fringe item, the required forms will be prepared and item placed on requisition.
- (4) To ensure that all requests are promptly submitted when stock items reach the Re-order Point.

E. Direct Exchange.

- (1) All those items marked R (recoverable) in the parts manuals and that meet the criteria established in AR 710-2 will be direct exchange.
- (2) The Maint. Center will prepare a list of all those items qualifying for Direct Exchange and distribute the listings to the supported units. This list should be revised as necessary to add/delete items in accordance with demands and applicable manuals.
- (3) Units will prepare DA Form 2402 and attach the same to the unserviceable part, this will be turned-in to the respective Maint. Center for exchange for a serviceable one.
- (4) Maintenance Centers No. 1 and No. 2 will exchange their recoverable repairable items with the Centro General de Mantenimiento.
- (5) The Supply Section will turn-in all unserviceable recoverable items to the maintenance shop to be repaired and returned to stocks.

4. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES.

- A. All material in need of repair beyond the units capabilities will be turned-in to the support maintenance center with a work request.
  - B. All items being turn-in to the maintenance centers for repair will be complete and have all organizational maintenance performed prior to it being accepted by the Centers.
- C. Shop Procedures.
- (1) A work order register (DA Form 2405) will be maintained by the shop officer to control all work being performed in the Maint. Center.
  - (2) A tub file will be maintained in all centers to file all work requests and pertaining papers.
  - (3) A complete technical inspection using DA Form 2404 will be performed at the maintenance center on all equipment being turned-in for repair.

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(4) The technical inspection will determine the extend of repairs required to be performed.

(5) A job order number will be assigned from the work order register (DA Form 2405) prior to starting any repairs. A folder will be prepared with all pertaining information and filed in the tub file.

(6) After the completion of the inspection, all repair parts required to accomplish the work will be placed on requisition by the shop officer through the Tech. Supply.

(7) If all repair parts are not available in the supply section to complete the repairs required, all due outs will be filed in the pertaining work order folder in the tub file.

(8) Partial issue of repair parts for specific job order will be properly marked and stored awaiting completion of requests.

(9) When all repair parts are available for the completion of a work order, but due to the work load repairs can not be initiated, procedures in (8) will be followed.

(10) The inspection section is required to perform during and after repair inspections to ensure qualify control and completeness of repairs.

(11) Upon completion of final inspection, work order register will be closed out and the owning unit will be contacted by mail and/or radio for the picking up of repaired item.

(12) All repairable assemblies and sub-assemblies will be repaired and returned to stock.

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ANNEX C (SUMMARY OF WORK COMPLETED) TO LIPR.

The following is a breakdown by tech service of work accomplished.

1. Communications and electronics.	Inpected	Repaired	Cannibalized
a. Maint. Center Gral (La Paz)			
(1) 34 items cannibalized and dropped from inventory which could not be repaired		25	34
(2) 25 items repaired			
b. Tarapaca.			
(1) 45 items were inspected	45	11	
(2) 11 items repaired			
c. Motorizados			
(1) 104 items inspected	104	55	21
(2) 55 items repaired			
(3) 21 items cannibalized			
d. Bolivar			
(1) 16 items inspected	16		11
(2) 11 items cannibalized			
e. Guaqui.			
No radios on hand			
f. Castrillo (Estado Mayor La Paz)			
(1) 38 items inspected	38	6	4
(2) 6 items repaired			
(3) 4 items cannibalized			
g. Barrientos			
(1) 11 items inspected	11		
(2) None repaired			
h. Colorados			
(1) 79 items inspected	79	50	16
(2) 50 items repaired			
(3) 16 items cannibalized			
i. Andino.			
(1) 12 items inspected	12		
(2) No items repaired or cannibalized			
j. 2nd Div Headquarters			
(1) 16 items inspected	16	16	
(2) 16 items repaired			
k. Cemacho			
(1) 24 items inspected	24	13	11
(2) 13 items repaired			
(3) 11 items cannibalized			

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	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
l. Challapata.			
(1) 127 items inspected	127	70	6
(2) 70 items repaired			
(3) 6 items cannibalized.			
m. Perez			
(1) 28 items inspected	28	18	1
(2) 18 items repaired			
(3) 1 item cannibalized			
n. Chichas.			
No radios on hand			
o. Loa.			
(1) 37 items inspected	37	18	7
(2) 18 items repaired			
(3) 7 items cannibalized			
p. RI Charagua			
None tactical on hand			
q. Campos (Boyacibe)			
None on hand			
r. GCI Abaroa (Cemiri)			
No Tactical on hand			
s. Cuevo			
No radios on hand			
t. RI5 Campero (Villa Montes)			
No radio on hand			
u. 3d Div Headquarters			
None			
v. RC3 Yacuiba			
No radios			
w. RI20 Padilla (Tarija)			
(1) 4 items inspected	4	4	
(2) 4 items repaired			
x. Sucre			
(1) 6 items inspected	6	6	
(2) 6 items repaired			
y. Maint Center No 2 (Guabira)			
(1) Inspected 3	3		
(2) None repaired or cannibalized			
z. 8th Div Headquarters (Santa Cruz)			
(1) 7 items inspected	7	7	
(2) 7 items repaired			

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	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
an. BI3 Pando (Santa Cruz) (1) 9 items inspected (2) 9 items repaired	9	9	
ab. RC8 Braun (Santa Cruz) (1) 2 items inspected (2) 2 items repaired	2	2	
ac. RII2 Manchego (1) 150 items inspected (2) 35 items repaired (3) 3 items cannibalization	150	85	3
ad. 8th Comando Regional Engrs No electronic equipment			
ae. Centro Maint No. 1 (Cochabamba) (1) 8 items inspected (2) No repairs necessary	8		
af. CITE (1) 53 items inspected (2) 10 items repaired (3) 25 items cannibalized	53	10	25
ag. Escuela de Clases (1) 100 items inspected (2) 10 items repaired (3) 71 items cannibalized	100	10	71
ah. Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor No radios			
ai. 7th Div Headquarters 13 items inspected	13		
aj. RI 10 Mernes (San Ignacio) No tactical radios			
ak. 6th Div Headquarters 1 item inspected	1		
al. RC 2 Ballivian (Trinidad) No radios			
am. RI 9 Jordan (Riveralta) 9 items inspected	9		
an. 5th Div Headquarters 18 items inspected	18		
ao. RI 15 Junin (Roboro) 6 items inspected			

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	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
ap. RC6 Castrillo (Puerto Suarez) 3 items inspecte	3		
TOTALS	929	405	210
2. Armament.			
a. Maint Center Gral (La Paz)			
(1) 2 3.5 rocket launchers cannibalized and dropped from inventory.			2
(2) 23 items repaired		23	
b. Tarapaca			
(1) 398 items inspected	398	55	
(2) 55 items repaired			
c. Motorizados			
(1) 537 items inspected	537	227	
(2) 227 items repaired			
d. Bolivar			
(1) 106 items inspected	106	56	
(2) 56 items repaired			
(3) 6 items cannibalized			6
e. Guaqui.			
(1) 293 items inspected	293	112	
(2) 112 items repaired			
f. Castrillo.			
(1) 112 items inspected	112	31	
(2) 31 items repaired			
g. Barrientos			
(1) 272 items inspected	272	118	
(2) 118 items repaired			
h. Colorados			
(1) 433 items inspected	433	131	
(2) 131 items repaired			
i. Andino			
(1) 159 items inspected	159	77	
(2) 77 items repaired			
j. 2nd Div Headquarters			
(1) 197 items inspected	197	57	
(2) 57 items repaired			
k. Camacho			
(1) 208 items inspected	208	123	
(2) 123 items repaired.			

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	Inspected	Repaired	Canibalized
l. Challapata. (1) 635 items inspected (2) 405 items repaired	635	405	
m. Perez (1) 216 items inspected (2) 111 items repaired	216	111	
n. Chichas (1) 347 items inspected (2) 150 items repaired	347	150	
o. Loa (1) 402 items inspected (2) 134 items repaired	402	134	
p. Charagua (1) 386 items inspected (2) 187 items repaired	386	187	
q. RI Campos (Boycobo) (1) 167 items inspected (2) 100 items repaired	167	100	
r. GOI Abaroa (Camiri) (1) 166 items inspected (2) 101 items repaired	166	101	
s. RM4 Cuevo (1) 147 items inspected (2) 49 repaired	147	49	
t. RI5 Campero (Villa Montes) (1) 162 items inspected (2) 55 items repaired	162	55	
u. 3d Div Headquarters (1) 75 items inspected (2) 27 repaired	75	27	
v. RC3 Yacuiba (1) 325 items inspected (2) 48 items repaired	325	48	
w. RI 20 Padilla (Tarija) (1) 194 items inspected (2) 51 items repaired	194	51	
x. RI2 Sucre (1) 167 items inspected (2) 47 repaired	167	47	

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	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
z. 8th Div. Headquarters. (1) 181 Items inspected. (2) 142 Items repaired.	181	142	
aa. BI 3 Pando (Santa Cruz) (1) 54 Items inspected (2) 47 Items repaired.	54	47	
ab. RC8 Braun (Santa Cruz) (1) 420 Items inspected. (2) 344 Items repaired.	420	344	
ac. RI 12 Manchego. (1) 914 Items inspected. (2) 197 repaired.	914	197	
ad. 8th Comando Regional Engrs. (1) 141 Items inspected (2) 14 Items repaired.	141	14	
ae. Centro Maint. No. 1 (Cochabamba) (1) 92 Items inspected. (2) No repairs necessary.	92		
af. CITE. (1) 279 Items inspected (2) 154 Items repaired.	279	154	
ag. Escuela de Clases. (1) 353 Items inspected (2) 201 Items repaired.	353	201	
ah. Escuela de Comando & Estado Mayor No weapons.			
ai. 7th Div. Headquarters. (1) 81 Items inspected. (2) 10 Items repaired.	81	10	
aj. RI 10 warnes (San Ignacio 43 Items inspected.	43		
ak. 6th Div. Headquarters 106 Items inspected	106		
al. RC 2 Ballivian (Trinidad) 183 Items inspected	183		
am. RI 9 Jordan (Riveralta) 242 Items inspected	242		
an. 5th Div. Headquarters. 67 Items inspected.	67		
ao. RI 15 Junin (Robore) 882 Items inspected.	882		

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	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
ap. RC 6 Castrillo (Puerto Suarez) 297 Items inspected.	297		
Total	10,456	3,508	8
3. Automotive and motorized equipment.			
a. Maint. Center Gral (La Paz)			
(1) 4 Items cannibalized.			4
(2) 92 sub-assemblies rebuild.			
(3) 20 vehicles repaired.			
(4) 12 Power generators repaired.			
b. Tarapaca.			
(1) 57 Vehicles inspected.	57	3	16
(2) 3 vehicles repaired.			
(3) 16 vehicles cannibalized.			
(4) 12 vehicles were classified repairable (repair parts were not available to complete repairs, engines were needed).			
c. Motorizados			
(1) 87 vehicles inspected.	87	6	
(2) 6 vehicles repaired.			
d. Bolivar			
(1) 3 vehicles inspected.	3	2	
(2) 2 vehicles reaired			
e. Guaqui			
(1) 19 vehicles inspected.	19	2	
(2) 2 Vehicles repaired.			
f. Castrillo.			
(1) 23 vehicles inspected.	23	3	
(2) 3 vehicles repaired.			
g. Barrientos.			
(1) 5 vehicles inspected.	5	1	
(2) 1 vehicle repaired.			
h. Colorados.			
(1) 21 vehicles inspected.	21	5	1
(2) 5 items repaired.			
(3) 1 item cannibalized.			
i. Andino.			
(1) 4 items inspected.	4	4	
(2) 4 items repaired.			
j. 2nd Div. Headquarters.			
(1) 9 items inspected.	9	1	
(2) 1 item repaired.			

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- k. Camacho.  
(1) 3 items inspected  
(2) 3 items repaired
- l. Challapata.  
(1) 69 items inspected  
(2) 20 items repaired
- m. Perez  
(1) 18 items inspected  
(2) 3 items repaired
- n. Chichas  
(1) 2 items inspected  
(2) 1 item repaired

	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
k.	3	3	
l.	69	20	
m.	18	3	
n.	2	1	

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SUBJ: Work Completed cont'd.

	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
o. Loa.			
(1) 17 items inspected.	17	5	1
(2) 5 items repaired.			
(3) 1 item cannibalized.			
p. RI Charagua.			
(1) 3 items inspected.	3	2	
(2) 2 items repaired.			
q. RI Campos (Boyacibe)			
(1) 4 items inspected.			
(2) 1 item repaired.	4	1	1
(3) 1 item cannibalized.			
r. GCL Avaroa (Camiri)			
(1) 12 items inspected.			
(2) 3 items cannibalized	12		3
s. RA4 Cuebo			
3 items inspected.	3		
t. R15 Combero (Villa Montes)			
2 items inspected.	2		
u. 3rd Div. Headquarters.			
(1) 12 items inspected.			
(2) 3 items cannibalized.	12		3
v. RC3 Yacuibe			
4 items inspected.	4		
w. RI 20 Radilla (Tarija)			
4 items inspected.	4		
x. R12 Sucre			
3 items inspected.	3		
y. Maint. Center No. 2 Guabira			
(1) 23 items inspected.	23	3	
(2) 3 items repaired.			
z. 8th Div. Headquarters.			
(1) 4 items inspected.	4	1	
(2) 1 item repaired.			
aa. BI 3 Pando (Santa Cruz)			
(1) 52 items inspected	52	3	14
(2) 3 items repaired.			
(3) 14 items cannibalized.			

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SUBJ: Work completed cont'd.

ab. RC 8 Baum (Santa Cruz)  
(1) 4 items inspected.  
(2) 2 items repaired

	Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
ab.	4	2	
ac.	34	5	6
ad.	2		2
ae.	19	1	3
af.	8		3
ag.	7		
ah.	5	1	
ai.	8		
aj.	2		
ak.	3		
al.	2		
am.	7		
an.	6		
ao.	4		

(1) 34 items inspected.  
(2) 5 items repaired.  
(3) 6 items cannibalized.

ae. Centro Maint. No. 1 (Cochabamba)  
(1) Inspected 19 items  
(2) 1 item repaired.  
(3) 3 items cannibalized.

af. CITE  
(1) 8 items inspected.  
(2) 3 items cannibalized

ag. Escuela de clases.  
7 items inspected.

ah. Escuela de Comando Y Estado Mayor  
(1) 5 items inspected.  
(2) 1 item repaired.

ai. 7th Div. Headquarters.  
8 items inspected.

aj. RI 10 Warnes (San Ignacio)  
2 items inspected.

ak. 6th Div. Headquarters  
3 items inspected.

al. RC 2 Ballivian (Trinidad)  
2 items inspected

am. RI 9 Jordan (Riveralta  
7 items inspected.

an. 5th Div. Headquarters.  
6 items inspected.

ao. RI 15 Junin (Robore  
4 items inspected.

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SUBJ: Work Completed cont'd

ap. RC6 Castrillo (Puerto Suarez)  
3 items inspected

Inspected	Repaired	Cannibalized
3		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>202</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>11.962</b>	<b>4.195</b>
		<b>275</b>

4. Supply.

a. Maint Center Gral La Paz.

- (1) Completed inventory of Authorized Stockage List. It was found that approximately 400 lines could not be identified. A cross reference check was made and most parts were identified. It was also found that there were approx. 800 lines that were in stock but were not recorded on Stock Record Cards. These items were picked-up in the card decks.
- (2) Completed purification of Card Decks to include cross referencing of parts numbers to FSN, pricing, and applicable end item. Implemented the reorder point system and extracted additional Authorized Stockage from applicable technical manuals according to known density listings. Processed and issued parts required for repairs needed in units and Prescribed Load List of the units inspected and authorized them.

b. Maint. Center No. 2.

- (1) Performed a complete inventory of parts on hand, made up cards decks for these plus all additional parts required for the expanded ASL.
- (2) Trained the supply personnel in all operations of ASL and parts management. Processed and issued parts required by units inspected for vehicles on non-operational status.

c. Maint. Center No. 1.

- (1) Performed a complete inventory of parts on hand, made up listing for the expanding of the ASL.
- (2) Implemented reorder points and stockage levels required.

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SUBJ: Work Completed cont'd

- d. Units listed in para. 1, 2 & 3.
- (1) Prepared Prescribed Load List for all units having qualified personnel and tools to perform organizational maintenance.
  - (2) Placed on requisition all repair parts needed to make the equipment 100% operational.
  - (3) Give instructional periods on subjects of scheduled maintenance and PLL and supply operations.

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App 1 to ANNEX C - Sub-Assembly Rebuild (Follow-on) - Cam Maint Ctr, LAFCS

	21/2 IN GAGE	1 1/2 IN GAGE	1 1/4 IN GAGE	1 1/8 IN GAGE	1 1/4 IN GAGE	TOTAL
Dec 72	3					3
Jan 73	1	4		3		8
Feb 73	1	2	4			7
Mar 73	3	2	6	1	1	13
Apr 73	6	6	4	1		17
May 73	5	7	6			18

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ANNEX D PERSONNEL TRAINED BY MTT

Maintenance.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Subofficers</u>	<u>Sergeants</u>	<u>Soldiers</u>	<u>Civilians</u>
Support level	9	18	10		8
Unit level	72	189	157	61	10
 Supply.					
Support level	3	5	6		2
Unit level	26	51	36		
 Instructors.	4	9			
 Specialized					
Rebuild/Power					
Generators		2			
Component rebuild		4	3		2
Equip Operations/Const	2		4		
 TOTALS	<u>114</u>	<u>281</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>22</u>

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SUBJECT: Speech by General Zenteno, Chief of Staff of the Bolivian Armed Forces, to RADM Griffiths and members of his staff on Friday, 22 September 1972.

1. Supporting the government there are the Armed Forces and several parties. Namely, FSB (Bolivian Socialist Falange), MNR (National Revolutionary Movement), SI (Independent Sectors), OC (Organization of Campesinos). Opposed to the government there are FRA (Anti-Imperial Revolutionary Front), ELN (Army of National Liberation), MIR (PRIN?) (National Leftist Revolutionary Party), PS (PSD) (Socialist Democratic Party), PC (PSB) (Communist Party of Bolivia), of two Branches M-Moscow (Pro-Soviet Communist Party) and P-Peking (Pro-Chinese Communist Party).

FFAA	FSB MNR SI OC	 ↓	FRA ELN MIR PS PC M P
------	------------------------	-------	---

2. Thus, the mission of the Armed Forces can be defined in three parts:

- a. External Security
- b. Internal Security
- c. Cooperation with the government in Civic Action type projects which contribute to the development of the nation.

3. The first mission is not directed against neighboring countries but only against ideological currents (movements) directed from afar against our government. For example, the subversive actions directed by Cuba. Against this we maintain a constant vigilance along our frontiers.

4. The second mission is to maintain stability within our borders which involve an area of about one million square kilometers.

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CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

• incl 4

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5. Mission number three involves looking for the best way to cooperate with and improve the mutual respect between the people and the government. The campesino organizations are helping us to integrate our efforts. In fact, we have a pact between these groups and the military to maintain a stable atmosphere thus, no strikes and no acts of subversion.

5. The Armed Forces Command is continually analyzing courses of action to counter the enemy, whose actions can be described in three areas:

- a. Guerrilla action in the countryside.
- b. Guerrilla action in the cities.
- c. Subversive activities such as strikes or street demonstrations.

6. We have had two experiences in the campaigns of the countryside.

a. 1967 There were 28 Cubans, led by Che Guevara, who infiltrated into the center of Bolivia. This group was well selected and well trained in the use of arms and other skills and thus, were very dangerous. However, within 10 months we had liquidated this group.

b. 1970 Another group, less dangerous because they did not have experience, were found. The group contained some Chileans and Peruvians but most were Bolivians.

c. 1972 But now we have some reports which we are evaluating about other groups. (The Intelligence sections of other countries are helping us).

- (1) One group was formed in Peru to penetrate along the river, Madre de Dios, in the North. This area is under the control of the Bolivian Naval Force.
- (2) Second group is seeking entry along the river, TAHUA MANU.
- (3) Elements of a third group, which have been staying along the border with Peru, are headed toward La Paz.
- (4) Elements of extremists groups are also reported in the river Negro near the Port of Carne (sic)

7. Now, in order to complete our investigation of these reports, we are sending undercover teams into these areas because we do not want to create an explosion in these commercially important (because of rubber) and growing areas by sending in uniformed troops.

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8. With regard to the Urban Guerrilla Activities we have broken the clandestine organization which existed in La Paz. We found 16 security houses with extensive basements containing weapons, communist literature and uniforms of our own army which are used on occasion to disorient our troops. There was evidence of (training or preparation) for assassination, kidnapping and sabotage. We have found dossiers on high officials which include names of all relatives, where they live, habits of the official including when he goes to work, etc. There is abundant documentation.

9. The third Activity of Subversion involves influencing several areas which exert political pressure on the government:

- a. The people of the three centers of production or miners zones which are North of La Paz, near Oruro and, although less dangerous, the area south of Potosi. We have 35,000 miners.
- b. Factory workers.
- c. Teachers.
- d. The students at the university and even the church is very much infiltrated.

10. Therefore, the Armed Forces are in a position of readiness and a most important factor for commanders is to fortify our efforts, not against our neighbors but against subversion and disorganization within the country. We are very attentive to these activities and to carry out our responsibilities, we have made studies and a new territorial division whereby the Bolivian Navy has the entire Amazon Basin, 14,000 Kilometers of navigable rivers and the Lake Titicaca region. Civic Action is most important in extending control over these vast areas.

11. I desire to extend to the Beni a plan such as we have in the Lake region. I appreciate your help with the hospital barge and the sanitary posts. I hope you realize that the problems that exist are not under the control of the military. The Ministry of Public Health is a civilian-run organization. We are continuing to seek their timely implementation of their portion of this project (C/F Gillen broke in and told General Zenteno that the President had ordered the Public Health Ministry to provide personnel to Project Titicaca - funding was to be from the President's Special Fund).

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12. Main Areas of Civic Action:

a. Health

- (1) Sanitary Posts
- (2) Hospital Barge
- (3) Education in preventative measures

b. Education

- (1) Building schools (there are three designs, one for each type of climate)
- (2) Literacy education for adults

c. Colonization (new towns)

- (1) Select new sites
- (2) Develop these sites

d. Communication/Transportation

- (1) Formation of small port captaincies
- (2) Extension of air transportation into areas where private business cannot go because it is not economical for them
- (3) Development of roads by Army Engineer Battalions to connect to the larger road net and tie in small towns

13. However, our needs are greater than our resources. We need help a little faster. We know, from many discussions, where our priorities are. The most important area is an axis from La Paz through Oruro to Santa Cruz (east-west line of communication). From this axis we can spread our efforts north and south to control the rest of Bolivia.

14. Thank you for your attention.


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SUBJECT: MAP-GA (Units/Major Equip/Funding Levels)

Prepared: 20 June 1973

F Y 71 F Y 72 F Y 73 F Y 74 F Y 75 F Y 76 F Y 77 F Y 78 F Y 79 F Y 80

Civl Action Equip



NOTES:

- (Solid) Funded
- ... (Dotted) Proposed
- - - Investment
- Operations & Maint.


Source: MAP Programmers, 20 June 1973

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SUBJECT: MAP-T

Prepared: 20 June 1973

FY 71   FY 72   FY 73   FY 74   FY 75   FY 76   FY 77   FY 78   FY 79   FY 80



NOTES:

- (Solid) Funded
- ... (Dotted) Proposed
- USARSA (School of Americas)
- MTT's

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